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Splitting Hairs: The Eleventh Circuit’s 
Take on Workplace Bans Against Black 
Women’s Natural Hair in EEOC v. 
Catastrophe Management Solutions 
D. WENDY GREENE* 
What does hair have to do with African descendant 
women’s employment opportunities in the 21st century? In 
this Article, Professor Greene demonstrates that Black 
women’s natural hair, though irrelevant to their ability to 
perform their jobs, constitutes a real and significant barrier 
to Black women’s acquisition and maintenance of employ-
ment as well as their enjoyment of equality, inclusion, and 
dignity in contemporary workplaces. For nearly half a cen-
tury, the federal judiciary has played a pivotal role in estab-
lishing and preserving this status quo. The Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeal’s recent decision in EEOC v. Catastrophe 
Management Solutions exacerbates what Professor Greene 
calls employers’ “hyper-regulation of Black women’s bod-
ies via their hair.” This Article considers how federal courts 
and namely the Eleventh Circuit have issued hair splitting 
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decisions in race-based “grooming codes discrimination 
cases” that decree: federal anti-discrimination law protects 
African descendants when they are discriminated against for 
adorning afros but statutory protection ceases once they 
grow their naturally textured or curly hair long or don it in 
braids, twists, or locks. Professor Greene explains that 
courts’ strict application of a “legal fiction” known as the 
immutability doctrine—and the biological notion of race 
that informs it—have greatly contributed to this incoherency 
in anti-discrimination law, which triggers troubling, tangi-
ble consequences in the lives of Black women. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2010—like many if not most job seekers—Chastity Jones, an 
African American woman, searched online for employment.1 Ms. 
Jones submitted a job application with Catastrophe Management So-
lutions (“CMS”), a company based in Mobile, Alabama that pro-
vides customer service support to insurance companies’ claims pro-
cessing.2 She applied for a Customer Service Representative posi-
tion, which required handling customer inquiries via telephone and 
basic computer knowledge.3 Along with thirty other applicants, 
CMS invited her to interview for the position.4 Jones wore a blue 
business suit, black pumps, and her hair in locks to the interview.5 
After an initial assessment of the required skills, CMS extended a 
job offer to Ms. Jones.6 Jones then met privately with CMS’ human 
resources manager, Jeannie Wilson, to reschedule required lab 
tests.7 As Ms. Jones departed the meeting, Ms. Wilson asked her if 
she was donning “dreadlocks,” to which Jones replied in the affirm-
ative.8 Ms. Wilson informed Jones that she could no longer hire her 
if she continued to wear locks, explaining “they tend to get messy, 
although I’m not saying yours are, but you know what I am talking 
about.”9 Ms. Wilson added that previously an African American 
male applicant was asked to cut off his locks to secure a position 
with CMS.10 Ms. Jones refused this condition of employment, re-
turned her initial paper work to Ms. Wilson, and left the building.11 
                                                                                                             
 1 EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL 7210059, 
at *1 (11th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at *2. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
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Regrettably, Ms. Jones’ encounter with  grooming codes dis-
crimination12 at the intersection of race and gender13 is not an iso-
lated incidence.14 Countless employers have instructed African de-
scendant15 women to cut off, cover, or alter their naturally textured 
hair in order to obtain and maintain employment for which they are 
qualified.16 Like Ms. Jones, other African descendant women have 
endured a barrage of offensive, stereotypical perceptions, denigrat-
ing their naturally textured hair as “messy,” “unkempt,” “dirty,” and 
“unprofessional,” not only during the hiring process, but also during 
                                                                                                             
 12 “Grooming codes discrimination” is a term that I developed to describe the 
specific form of inequality and infringement upon one’s personhood resulting 
from the enactment and enforcement of formal as well as informal appearance and 
grooming mandates, which bear no relationship to one’s job qualifications and 
performance. However, such mandates implicate protected categories under anti-
discrimination law like race, color, age, disability, sex, and/or religion. 
 13 For the seminal article on intersectional claims of discrimination involving 
Black women, see Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race 
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist The-
ory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) [hereinafter De-
marginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex]. 
 14 See Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 2016 WL 7210059 at *11 (citing ten 
cases from various courts where grooming policies were at issue). 
 15 This Article will use African descendant, African American, and Black in-
terchangeably to describe individuals who identify as having African ancestry. 
Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw has explained that “Black” deserves—– capitaliza-
tion because “Blacks, like Asians [and] Latinos. . . constitute a specific cultural 
group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.” Kimberlé Williams 
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) [hereinafter 
Race, Reform, and Retrenchment] (citing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, 
Marxism, Method and State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 516 (1982)). 
Additionally, Professor Neil Gotanda contends that the capitalization of Black is 
appropriate since it “has deep political and social meaning as a liberating term.” 
Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 4 n.12 (1991). I agree with both Professors Crenshaw and Gotanda and for both 
reasons throughout this article when I reference people of African descent indi-
vidually and collectively the word, Black, will be represented as a proper noun. 
However, I maintain the preference of authors to whom I cite directly as it pertains 
to their reference of particular racial groups with proper nouns. 
 16 See Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, WL 7210059 at *11 (citing ten cases 
where grooming policies were the basis for dismissal). 
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the course of their employment.17 As a result, in lieu of donning 
twists, locks, braids, or afros, many African descendant women don 
straightened hairstyles to avoid the stigmatization of their natural 
hair, which often engenders harassment, unfavorable performance 
evaluations, as well as loss or denial of employment.18 Notably, fed-
eral courts have not treated these instances of grooming codes dis-
crimination, uniquely and commonly affecting African descendant 
women,19 as unlawful race and/or gender discrimination under fed-
eral law—except when employers regulate or ban afros adorned by 
African descendant women.20 
This Article explores the origins and the most recent judicial re-
affirmation of this hair-splitting distinction between permissible and 
impermissible regulation of natural hairstyles under federal anti-dis-
crimination law. In Part II, this Article briefly discusses the federal 
anti-discrimination laws that African descendant women have uti-
lized to challenge the legality of natural hair bans in the workplace. 
Part II also examines the seminal case, Rogers v. American Airlines, 
wherein private employers were essentially afforded an unfettered 
right to regulate and proscribe natural hairstyles adorned by African 
descendant women except afros.21 Part III details the litigation his-
tory of the most recent federal case of grooming codes discrimina-
tion against natural hairstyles, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) v. Catastrophe Management Solutions. 
Both the federal district court and the Eleventh Circuit in EEOC v. 
Catastrophe Management Solutions strictly applied the immutabil-
ity doctrine to hold that CMS’ prohibition against Ms. Jones’ locks 
                                                                                                             
 17 In 2014, the United States Army re-issued Regulation 670-1, “Wear and 
Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia”: a grooming regulation that ex-
pressly barred servicewomen from donning two-strand twists and locks as well as 
severely regulated the width of braids namely cornrows. Maya Rhodan, U.S. Mil-
itary Rolls Back Restrictions on Black Hairstyles, TIME: POLITICS (Aug. 13, 
2014), http://time.com/3107647/military-black-hairstyles/. The Army’s grooming 
policy described these ways in which African American service women com-
monly wear their natural hair in derogatory terms—as “matted and unkempt.” Id. 
 18 D. Wendy Greene, Black Women Can’t Have Blonde Hair. . . in the Work-
place, 14 J. GEN. RACE & JUST. 405, 405–06 (2011) [hereinafter Black Women 
Can’t Have Blonde Hair]. 
 19 Id. at 406–07. 
 20 Rogers v. Am. Airlines Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 21 Id. at 231–33. 
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did not constitute unlawful race discrimination under Title VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Per the courts, Title VII’s protections 
against race discrimination only extend to covered employers’ reg-
ulation of immutable characteristics— characteristics with which 
one is born, are fixed, difficult to change, and/or displayed by all 
individuals who share the same racial identity. This Article argues 
that the immutability doctrine, namely strict immutability, is a “legal 
fiction”: a judicially created rule which is not based in fact yet is 
treated as such in legitimizing zones of legal protection and inclu-
sion. Guided by this legal fiction, the Eleventh Circuit in EEOC v. 
Catastrophe Management Solutions fortified the lawful deprivation 
of not only employment opportunities for which African descendant 
women are qualified but also equal terms, privileges, and conditions 
of employment when they grow their naturally textured hair long or 
when it simply does not fit the mold of an afro.22  In so doing, the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision sanctions the “hyper-regulation” of 
Black women’s bodies via their hair in contemporary American 
workplaces.23 
I. TWISTED COVERAGE: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION STATUTES AND ROGERS V. AMERICAN AIRLINES 
A. Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation: Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act and Section 1981 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act 
No federal law specifically governs appearance discrimination 
and only a few jurisdictions prohibit workplace discrimination on 
the basis of appearance.24 Consequently, Black women contesting 
employers’ formal or informal hair regulations have brought race 
and/or sex discrimination claims under federal anti-discrimination 
laws—namely Section 1981 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and Title 
                                                                                                             
 22 Per federal precedent, employers are also able to prohibit or regulate the 
donning of wigs or hair extensions shaped in the form of twists, braids, or locks 
that are made from synthetic or natural hair. See, e.g., Rogers, 527 F. Supp. At 
231–32 (holding that an employer can lawfully prohibit an African descendant 
woman from donning cornrow braids). 
 23 EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL 7210059, 
at *1–14 (11th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016). 
 24 See, e.g., Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2202 
(2015). 
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VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act—or state analogues.25 Section 
1981, a Reconstruction-era statutory provision, provides that all in-
dividuals possess the same right to “make and enforce contracts. . . 
as is enjoyed by white citizens.”26 Courts have interpreted Section 
1981 to prohibit intentional race27 and color28 discrimination in the 
employment context.29 Over a century later, with the enactment of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress promulgated a more express 
and expansive proscription against workplace discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, sex, religion, and national origin.30 The substan-
tive provisions of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act make it 
unlawful for an employer: 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any indi-
vidual, or otherwise to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would 
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
                                                                                                             
 25 See Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, WL 7210059 at *11; see also Johnson 
v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. 421 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1975). 
 26 42 U.S.C § 1981(a) (2012). The Supreme Court has interpreted this statu-
tory language as a prohibition against intentional race discrimination in private 
employment. See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459–60. 
 27 See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459–60. 
 28 See e.g., Jordan v. Whelan Sec. of Illinois, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 746, 753 
(N.D. Ill. 2014) (recognizing Section 1981 encompasses employment discrimina-
tion claims on the basis of color). 
 29 Courts have held that Section 1981 does not permit independent claims of 
national origin discrimination; however, due to the often indistinguishable nature 
between these bases of discrimination, courts may allow national origin discrim-
ination claims to proceed when the evidence supports a claim of race discrimina-
tion. See Short v. Mando Am. Corp., 805 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1267–68 (M.D. Ala. 
2011). 
 30 See 42 U.S.C. §2000e–2 (2012). 
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status as an employee, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.31 
Federal anti-discrimination laws also protect current, former,32 
and prospective employees who suffer retaliation for opposing an 
unlawful employment practice or participating in an investigation 
related to unlawful discrimination.33 The United States Supreme 
Court has interpreted Title VII to prohibit intentional discrimina-
tion—employment decisions that are consciously motivated by ani-
mus,34 stereotypes,35 and mere consideration of a protected classifi-
cation36—as well as unintentional discrimination.37 In grooming 
codes discrimination cases challenging express policies that man-
date different grooming or dress requirements for men and women, 
                                                                                                             
 31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2012). Specifically, Title VII prohibits an 
employer from retaliating “against any of his employees or applicants for employ-
ment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, 
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under 
this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012). See CBOCS W., Inc. v. Hum-
phries, 553 U.S. 442, 445 (2008) (holding that retaliation claims are actionable 
under Section 1981). 
 32 See e.g., Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509–10 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that former employees have standing to bring Title VII retaliation claims 
though the plain language does expressly contemplates current and prospective 
employees). 
 33 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 34 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); see 
also Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011). 
 35 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256–58 (1989). 
 36 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 592–93 (2009) (holding that municipal 
government’s consideration of race in its decision not to certify promotional exam 
results, which disproportionately impacted African American firefighters and thus 
resulted in a negative employment decision for white male firefighters and a His-
panic male firefighter, constitutes intentional race discrimination under Title VII). 
 37 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (adopting a disparate 
impact theory of discrimination in Title VII cases to redress “not only overt dis-
crimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in opera-
tion”). In 1991, Congress codified the disparate theory of liability whereby the 
plaintiff can recover if she demonstrates that: (1) a facially neutral employment 
practice causes a disproportionate impact on individuals who share the same reli-
gion, color, national origin, race, or sex; and (2) the covered employer fails to 
adopt a less discriminatory alternative that is job related and meets the employer’s 
business needs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)–(C) (2012). 
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federal courts have treated such requirements—when they impose 
undue burdens upon women or men—as intentional sex discrimina-
tion, unless the employer can produce persuasive evidence that an 
employee’s conformity with the gender-based grooming or dress 
standard is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably neces-
sary to the operation of the employer’s business.38 
Black women have contended employers’ regulation of their 
natural hair constitutes a form of race discrimination or discrimina-
tion at the intersection of race and gender39 in violation of Section 
1981 and/or Title VII.40 However, almost uniformly, federal courts 
have decided that their cases of grooming codes discrimination are 
not actionable.41 A primary reason for federal courts’ non-recogni-
tion of their race discrimination claims is a judicial understanding of 
race as an immutable characteristic: an identity trait that is fixed or 
difficult to change and/or with which one is born and is marked by 
                                                                                                             
 38 Where an employment practice makes terms and conditions of employ-
ment expressly on the basis of sex, religion, or national origin, Title VII provides 
a statutory affirmative defense: the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification 
(“BFOQ”) defense. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2012). In narrow circumstances, 
a covered employer can escape Title VII liability for intentional sex, religion, or 
national origin discrimination if the employer can produce persuasive evidence 
that the challenged employment practice is a “bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business.” Id. Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, the employer must demonstrate that the facially 
discriminatory employment requirement concerns job-related skills and aptitudes 
based upon objectively verifiable evidence rather than “general subjective stand-
ards.” Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200–201 (1991). 
 39 See Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Community Assn., 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 
1980) (holding that Title VII permits discrimination claims on the basis of multi-
ple impermissible characteristics and thus, a Black woman could pursue her claim 
that she was discriminated against because of both her race and gender). 
 40 D. Wendy Greene, A Multidimensional Analysis of What Not to Wear in 
the Workplace: Hijabs and Natural Hair, 8 FIU L. REV. 331, 336 (2013) [herein-
after What Not to Wear in the Workplace]. 
 41 In her groundbreaking work, Professor Crenshaw attributes the failure of 
Black women’s intersectional claims of discrimination to courts viewing their ex-
perience along a “single-axis analysis” that distorts the “multidimensionality of 
Black women’s experiences.” Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, 
supra note 13, at 139. 
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features that all or only individuals who share a racial identity pos-
sess.42 As explained in the following sections, this concept of im-
mutability advanced in Rogers v. American Airlines and EEOC v. 
Catastrophe Management Solutions is a “legal fiction” that is rooted 
in a discredited view of race as biological and unchangeable.43 
B. Rogers v. American Airlines 
Shortly after Title VII was enacted, discrimination cases con-
testing the legality of employment policies controlling the ways 
                                                                                                             
42See e.g., Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(holding that an employer’s regulation of a Black female employee’s cornrow 
braids did not violate Title VII because braids are not an “immutable characteris-
tic”). Significantly, not all arbiters of race-based grooming discrimination cases 
have applied the immutability doctrine in analyzing whether a policy banning Af-
rican descendants’ braided hair constitutes unlawful race discrimination. See Chi-
cago Commission on Human Relations in the matters of Scott v. Owner of Club 
720 and Lyke v. Owner of Club 720 (February 16, 2011) (finding that a Chicago 
night club’s ban against braids adorned by African descendant men violated the 
Chicago Human Rights Ordinance’s prohibitions against race discrimination in 
part because the night club “disfavored a hairstyle associated with one racial 
group based on stereotypical assumptions about wearers of the hairstyle, imposing 
an additional burden on that group in order to enjoy the full use of the public 
accommodations it offered”). Opinion located here: https://www.cityofchicago.
org/content/dam/city/depts/cchr/DataPortalDocs/09P002Feb162011.pdf 
  43 See D. Wendy Greene, Categorically Black, White, or Wrong: “Misper-
ception Discrimination” and the State of Title VII Protection, 47 U. MICH. J. L. 
REF. 87, 134 (2013) [hereinafter Categorically Black, White, or Wrong] (positing 
that our understanding of racial identity is influenced by broader social, political, 
legal, and economic forces, as well as specific personal experiences). A recently 
filed Title VII race discrimination claim frustrates the contention that racial iden-
tity is unchangeable. All of his life, police sergeant Cleon Brown self-identified 
as white; however, Brown claimed that after receiving the results of an Ances-
try.com test, which reported that he was 18 percent African descendant, he began 
to identify as African-American. Brown alleged that he became the target of ra-
cially derogatory treatment after he shared the results of the Ancestry.com test 
with his colleagues and supervisors. https://cbsdetroit.files.wordpress.com/2017/
05/2017-04-11-brown-cleon-ecf-001-plaintiffs-complaint-and-jury-demand.pdf. 
This case presses the court to contemplate similar, important queries posed in 
EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions. For example: 1) what is race—is it 
a biological or social construct; 2) should Title VII’s definition of race be in-
formed by historic or contemporary understandings of race; and 3) is statutory 
protection contingent upon the alleged discrimination related to an impermissible 
classification or the identity trait of the plaintiff? 
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Black women wore their natural hair surfaced.44 For example, Black 
women argued that formal and informal mandates to change their 
afros or “bushy” hair as a condition of employment constituted un-
lawful race discrimination. Both the EEOC and federal courts 
treated such regulations as violative of Title VII’s substantive lan-
guage.45 Yet, it was the 1981 decision in Rogers v. American Air-
lines that came to define the contours of race-based challenges 
against grooming codes discrimination in the workplace.46 
A year after becoming a customer service agent, Renee Rodgers, 
an eleven-year American Airlines employee, wore her hair in corn-
rows.47 In turn, American Airlines implemented a grooming policy 
that banned employees in customer service positions from wearing 
braided hairstyles.48 Rodgers argued that American Airlines’ 
grooming regulation constituted race and sex discrimination in vio-
lation of Title VII and other civil rights laws.49 Through her conten-
tion that American Airlines’ policy uniquely discriminated against 
her and other Black women, she raised an intersectional claim of 
                                                                                                             
 44 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 168 
(7th Cir. 1976). In Jenkins, the plaintiff asserted a Title VII race discrimination 
claim because her supervisor informed her that she “could never represent Blue 
Cross with [her] Afro.” Id. at 167. The court held that the supervisor’s lone state-
ment was sufficient to support a race discrimination claim because “[a] lay per-
son’s description of racial discrimination could hardly be more explicit. The ref-
erence to the Afro hairstyle was merely the method by which the plaintiff’s su-
pervisor allegedly expressed the employer’s racial discrimination.” Id. at 168. 
 45 Id. But see Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., No. C80-222A, 1981 WL 224, at 
*2 (N.D. Ga. May 26, 1981) (holding that a Black woman’s discipline and subse-
quent termination for refusing to remove beads from her braids did not amount to 
a facially discriminatory policy on the basis of race in part because “the wearing 
of beads in one’s hair is [not] an immutable characteristic, such as national origin, 
race, or sex”). 
 46 See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231–32. 
 47 Professor Paulette Caldwell reveals in her scholarly examination of the 
case that the accurate spelling of the plaintiff’s last name is Rodgers though the 
official case name spells it Rogers. See Paulette M. Caldwell, Intersectional Bias 
and the Courts: The Story of Rogers v. Am. Airlines, in RACE LAW STORIES 571, 
575 n.12 (Devon W. Carbado & Rachel F. Moran eds., 2008) [hereinafter Inter-
sectional Bias and the Courts]. 
 48 See id. at 576. 
 49 See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231. 
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discrimination.50 Rodgers explained that cornrows were “histori-
cally, a fashion and style adopted by Black American women, re-
flective of cultural, historical essence of Black women in American 
society.”51  To Rodgers, American Airlines’ braids ban implicated 
the same “racial dynamics” as an employer’s prohibition against af-
ros and thus should likewise be deemed an act of unlawful race dis-
crimination.52 The court concurred that if American Airlines enacted 
a ban against afros such a policy would likely violate Title VII. 
However, it did not apply this reasoning to American Airlines’ no 
braids policy. 
The Rogers court grounded its distinguishable legal treatment of 
cornrows and afros in the immutability doctrine. It pronounced that 
federal protections against race discrimination only extend to a cov-
ered employer’s regulation of or adverse treatment based upon im-
mutable traits: traits with which one is born, are fixed, difficult to 
change, and/or displayed by individuals who share the same racial 
identity.53 Therefore, an actionable claim of race discrimination ne-
cessitated evidence that African descendants exclusively or predom-
inantly adorned braids.54 By articulating this evidentiary standard, it 
appears that the Rogers court presumed that a workplace prohibition 
against afros constituted a form of race discrimination because Af-
rican descendants predominantly or exclusively don or are born with 
an afro. However, as it pertained to American Airlines’ regulation 
of braids, the court reasoned that Rodgers was unable to satisfy this 
essentialist (and essentially impossible) prima facie requirement 
since Bo Derrek, a white actress, donned cornrows in the movie 
“10.”55 Despite the long history of African descendant women wear-
ing braids as a matter of course, the court implied that Bo Derrek 
popularized cornrows, thereby devaluing Ms. Rodgers’ claim that 
for Black women, cornrows are imbued with deep cultural and per-
sonal meaning.56 The court effectively concluded that since a white 
woman braided her hair, donning cornrows could in no way inform 
                                                                                                             
 50 Intersectional Bias and the Courts, supra note 47, at 573. 
 51 See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231–32. 
 52 See id.  
 53 See id. 
 54 See id. at 232. 
 55 See id. 
 56 See id. 
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Ms. Rodgers’ understanding of herself as a Black woman. In es-
sence, the judge dictated to Ms. Rodgers which of her individual 
characteristics he believed were consequential to her personhood as 
a Black woman, usurping the autonomy, freedom, and dignity em-
bodied in defining her identity based upon her lived experience.57 
To add insult to injury, the court characterized Ms. Rodgers’ corn-
row braids, which were the result of synthetic hair extensions, as an 
“easily changeable artifice.”58 In so doing, the Rogers court sug-
gested American Airlines’ regulation of Ms. Rodgers’ hair did not 
implicate Title VII’s proscriptions against race discrimination be-
cause her cornrows were not natural since they were not an inevita-
ble physical feature of African ancestry.59 Rather, Ms. Rodgers’ 
braids were a mutable, stylistic choice which she could easily 
change unlike an “immutable racial” characteristic presumably like 
her skin color or an afro.60 Thus, the Rogers court opined that Amer-
ican Airlines’ no braids policy had “at most a negligible effect on 
employment opportunity” and concerned “a matter of relatively low 
importance in terms of the constitutional interests protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII.”61 
It is important to note that the court erred in assuming that all, 
most, or only people who identify as African descendants have 
adorned, or can adorn, an afro. Not all or only individuals of African 
descent possess hair texture that can be shaped into an afro. Indeed, 
the hair texture and hairstyles among African descendant women 
specifically, and African descendant people generally, are diverse 
and infinite. In A Multidimensional Analysis of What Not to Wear: 
Hijabs and Natural Hair, I explained:  
                                                                                                             
 57 The Rogers court is not alone; relying upon Rogers and subsequent legal 
precedent, the federal district court in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solu-
tions rejected the EEOC’s argument that Ms. Jones’ naturally locked hair is a de-
fining characteristic of her identification as a Black woman. See EEOC v. Catas-
trophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL 7210059, at *9–11 (11th Cir. 
Dec. 13, 2016). 
 58 See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232. 
 59 Intersectional Bias and the Courts, supra note 47, at 580. 
 60 See Rogers¸ 527 F. Supp. at 232. The court explained that American Air-
lines’ regulation of Ms. Rodgers’ braids did not violate Title VII because it did 
not “regulate on the basis of any immutable characteristic of the employees in-
volved.” Id. at 231. 
 61 Id. at 231. 
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not all Black women wear natural hairstyles, and for 
those Black women who do, the reasons are likewise 
varied and are not mutually exclusive. Black women 
may wear a natural hairstyle to minimize or eliminate 
the physical and financial inconveniences that come 
along with wearing straightened hairstyles. Black 
women may wear their hair naturally for aesthetic 
reasons, as a form of racial/ethnic expression, and/or 
to challenge pervasive expectations and pressures to 
wear a straightened hairstyle as an implicit petition 
for genuine inclusion, respect, and equal treatment. 
Finally, Black women donning natural hairstyles are 
also simply wearing their hair the way in which it 
grows on their heads—with or without any motive or 
meaning. Thus, like hijabs for some Muslim women, 
donning natural hairstyles for some Black women is 
a defining feature of their identity and personhood.62 
The reasons for donning natural hairstyles and the processes by 
which Black women achieve them are also varied and often times 
more complicated than what meets the eye.63 The court may have 
inaccurately concluded that braids are an easily changeable charac-
teristic based upon a lack of knowledge about the process of braid-
ing and removing braids, especially those that are created with hair 
extensions. A lack of understanding may also explain the court’s 
view of Ms. Rodgers’ braided hair as a simple aesthetic choice rather 
than a matter which can be simultaneously complex, deeply per-
sonal, and organic.64 The court’s miseducation about African de-
scendant women’s hair produced a powerful legal precedent—one 
that accorded employers essentially limitless freedom, authority, 
and privilege to stigmatize, exclude, and marginalize African de-
scendant women in the workplace because of their hair. 
For nearly fifty years, U.S. federal courts have adjudicated a va-
riety of legal challenges against employers’ formal and informal 
regulation of Black women’s hair. Since the 1970s, Black women 
                                                                                                             
 62 Id. 
 63 What Not to Wear in the Workplace, supra note 40, at 358–59. 
 64 See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232 (suggesting that Ms. Rodgers donned the 
all-braided hairstyle in response to the popularity of the film “10”). 
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have opposed workplace prohibitions against their adornment of 
synthetic braids,65 twists,66 locks,67 cornrows with beads,68 straight-
ened blonde hair,69 locked blonde hair,70 finger waves71, and pony-
tails72. The breadth of litigation exposes not only the diversity of 
Black women’s hair but also the hyper-regulation of Black women’s 
bodies in the workplace via their hair. Indeed, one employer sought 
to restrain a Black woman’s agency and desire to wear her hair dif-
ferently by requiring her to seek supervisory approval before she 
changed her hair but did not impose the same mandates on white 
female employees.73 Other employers have directed or advised 
Black women to change their hair or hair color until their appearance 
satisfies a supervisor’s subjective standards of acceptability and 
beauty.74 Employers have also publicly stigmatized Black women’s 
hair and placed Black women in a humiliating Catch-22: either 
cover,75 alter,76 or cut off your hair altogether or be deprived of cur-
rent or prospective employment. Black women’s hair has also col-
ored supervisors’ perceptions of their job performance, resulting in 
                                                                                                             
 65 Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 66 Pitts v. Wild Adventures, No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306 (M.D. 
Ga. Apr. 25, 2008). 
 67 EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, Inc., 2016 WL 7210059. 
 68 Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., No. C80-222A, 1981 WL 224, at *1 (N.D. 
Ga. May 26, 1981). 
 69 See D. Wendy Greene, Black Women Can’t Have Blonde Hair . . . in the 
Workplace, 14 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 405 (2011) [herinafter Black Women 
Can’t Have Blonde Hair]. 
 70 EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, Inc., 2016 WL 7210059. 
 71 Hollins v. Atl. Co., 188 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See generally, Pitts v. Wild Adventures, No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 
1899306 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2008). 
 75 Pitts v. Wild Adventures, No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306 (M.D. 
Ga. Apr. 25, 2008); Burchette v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 
8786, 2009 WL 856682 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2009). 
 76 Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Pitts v. 
Wild Adventures, No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 
2008; Burchette v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 8786, 2009 WL 
856682 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2009). 
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decreased compensation,77 discipline,78 and termination79 often ac-
companied by demoralizing and subordinating judgments about 
their professionalism and femininity as well as the judiciousness of 
their personal grooming choices. 
For example, in Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Patricia Pitts alleged 
that when she reported to work with her hair in cornrows, her super-
visor expressed disapproval and offered an unsolicited “suggestion” 
that she change her hair into a “pretty” style.80 Despite the cost and 
time involved, Ms. Pitts attempted to comply with the supervisor’s 
“recommendation” while also donning her natural hair presumably 
in a way Ms. Pitts found attractive. In lieu of cornrows, Ms. Pitts 
returned to work donning two-strand twists.81 Her supervisor again 
disapproved because she felt Ms. Pitts’ two-strand twists too closely 
resembled locks.82 Ms. Pitts refused to expend additional cost and 
time to restyle her hair since Wild Adventures did not have formal 
grooming policy in place. Furthermore, in no way was Ms. Pitts’ 
hair relevant to her job performance. Within days, however, Wild 
Adventures disseminated a written policy that banned “dreadlocks, 
cornrows, beads, and shells” unless they were covered by a hat or 
visor.83 Effectively, Ms. Pitts and other Black employees84 could 
                                                                                                             
 77 Hollins v. Atl. Co., 188 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 78 In March 2015, a Black woman who worked as a restaurant hostess for a 
Canadian franchise reported that management publicly reprimanded her when she 
began wearing her hair in braids, calling her hair unacceptable, instructing her to 
go home, and subsequently denying her shifts because they did not “want that 
kind of look . . . at the restaurant.” The former hostess filed a race discrimination 
complaint against the restaurant with the Quebec Human Rights Commission, 
which is the first of its kind. http://www.diversityinc.com/news/hairstyles-of-
black-women-cases-of-discrimination/. 
 79 See, e.g., id. See also Bryant v. BEGIN Manage Program, 281 F. Supp. 2d 
561 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); Burchette v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 
8786, 2009 WL 856682 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2009). 
 80 Pitts, No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306 at *1 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 
2008). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id.  
 84 It is important to note that Black women are not singularly affected by 
grooming policies regulating natural hairstyles. Black men have also challenged 
these policies on the ground that they are racially discriminatory. See Eatman v. 
United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). For a more de-
tailed discussion of the Eatman case, D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s Hair 
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neither wear their natural hair freely nor freely make choices about 
their natural hair. Like Renee Rodgers, Patricia Pitts challenged 
Wild Adventures’ hyper-regulation of her natural hair as a form of 
race discrimination.85 And like Renee Rodgers, Patricia Pitts’ race 
discrimination claim was rejected by the court.86 Citing to Rogers, 
the Pitts court legalized an employer’s hyper-regulation of a Black 
woman’s natural hair when not shaped like an afro based upon sub-
jective and paternalistic ideals about what management finds “at-
tractive,” “acceptable,” and therefore “permissible” in the work-
place. 
Also like Pitts, the Rogers court made invisible the burdens and 
attendant injury Ms. Rodgers, and countless African descendant 
women like her, suffer as a consequence of the hyper-regulation of 
their bodies via their hair. As I explained in earlier work: 
[The Rogers] court could not concede the particular 
stigmatization and offense that Renee Rodgers, as a 
Black woman, would experience when American 
Airlines instructed that: as a customer service repre-
sentative, her donning cornrows was specifically 
prohibited because it did not reflect the “conservative 
and business-like image” that American Airlines’ 
grooming policy intended to enforce; she could wear 
the cornrows off-duty; and if she were to maintain 
her cornrows she could not wear her hair freely but 
rather she would need to “wear her hair into a bun 
and wrap a hairpiece around the bun during working 
hours.” American Airline’s grooming regulations 
conveyed the message (which the court reified) that 
cornrows—a natural hairstyle Black women com-
monly and most notably wear—was an unprofes-
sional and immodest hairstyle in need of covering 
and thus, an unacceptable and impermissible hair-
style for Black women to wear in their professional 
capacities, especially when engaging with the public. 
                                                                                                             
(and Other Race-Based Characteristics) Got to Do With It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1355, 1372-76, 1385-91 (2008) [hereinafter What’s Hair]. 
 85 Pitts, 2008 WL 1899306 at *6. 
 86 Id. 
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Indeed, the court was rather dismissive of not only 
the stigmatic but also the physical injury that Amer-
ican Airlines inflicted upon Rodgers by requiring 
that she wear a hairpiece to mask her natural hair-
style. In response to Rodgers’ claims that she suf-
fered severe headaches from wearing a hairpiece, the 
court suggested rather imperviously “a larger hair-
piece would seem in order.”87 
Furthermore, the court intimated that American Airline’s regu-
lation of Ms. Rodger’s hair would need to rise to the level of a hos-
tile work environment in order for her injury to be cognizable.88 
Since Ms. Rodgers’ seminal case of race-based grooming codes dis-
crimination, courts have preserved the Rogers court’s narrow con-
stitution of race, discrimination, and remediable injury under federal 
civil rights laws.89 Courts have thereby treated employment policies 
banning African descendant women’s natural hair as harmless acts 
of employer prerogative unrelated to race and gender and inconse-
quential to workplace equality.90 
In sanctioning the heightened scrutiny and occupational injuries 
that Black women endure at the intersection of race and gender when 
they freely don their naturally textured or curly hair in braids, twists, 
or locks,91 Rogers has aided the suppression of Black women’s ex-
ercise of freedom, autonomy, and agency over their hair and through 
                                                                                                             
 87 What Not to Wear in the Workplace, supra note 40, at 349. 
 88 Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232 at 233 (remarking “plaintiff’s allegations do 
not amount to charging American with ‘a practice of creating a working environ-
ment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination,’ or one ‘so heavily pol-
luted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychologi-
cal stability of minority group workers. . . .’) (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 
234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
 89 See EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL 
72210059, at *11 (11th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016). 
 90 See generally Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 
(5th Cir. 1975); see generally Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 2016 WL 7210059. 
 91 See Rogers v. Am. Airlines Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); 
see also Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 169 (1976) 
(holding that a Black female plaintiff filed a sufficient EEOC charge alleging race 
and gender discrimination after her supervisor allegedly informed her that she was 
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their hair. Indeed, Rogers buttresses the lawfulness of making 
straightened hairstyles—a racialized and gendered appearance norm 
resulting from a long history of privileging hair texture and hair-
styles associated with white women92—an implicit or explicit term 
or condition of employment for Black women.93 As a result, Black 
women’s hair plays a defining—and lawful—role in their employa-
bility and attendant economic and emotional security. With the fil-
ing of EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions94 in 2014, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission undertook a herculean 
feat to disrupt this reality. The EEOC endeavored to invalidate over 
three decades of negative precedent stemming from the Rogers de-
cision, which courts mechanically applied to reject not only Black 
women’s substantive claims of unlawful race discrimination, but 
also their claims of retaliation for opposing an express hiring prac-
tice of excluding from consideration qualified applicants with 
braided hair as a form of racial discrimination.95 
                                                                                                             
denied a promotion because she was unable to represent the company wearing an 
afro). 
 92 See D. Wendy Greene, Black Women Can’t Have Blonde Hair. . . in the 
Workplace, 14 J. Gen. Race & Just. 405, 428 (2011) [hereinafter Black Women 
Can’t Have Blonde Hair]. 
 93 A recent Google search for “unprofessional hairstyles for women” primar-
ily generated pictures of Black women donning natural hairstyles whereas a 
search for “professional styles for women” yielded pictures of white women with 
straightened coiffed hairstyles. Leigh Alexander, Do Google’s “Unprofessional 
Hair” Results Show It Is Racist?, GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2016, 3:50 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/08/does-google-unprofes-
sional-hair-results-prove-algorithms-racist. 
 94 First Amended Complaint at ¶ 27, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 
2014 WL 4745282 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 17, 2014) (No. 1:13-cv-00476-CB-M) [here-
inafter First Amended Complaint]. 
 95 See, e.g., McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-cv-0196-cc, 1996 WL 
755779, at *1–2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996) (rejecting plaintiff’s Title VII retalia-
tion claim by holding that the plaintiff’s opposition to her employer–temporary 
staffing agency’s policy of not referring “qualified applicants with ‘braided’ hair 
styles for employment positions” was not protected activity because such policy 
as a matter of law did not violate Title VII’s proscriptions against race–based em-
ployment practices). See also Pitts, 2008 WL 1899306 at *8 (citing to McBride 
as precedential support for denying plaintiff’s retaliation claim based upon her 
opposition to informal and formal regulations of her natural hair). 
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II. SPLITTING HAIRS: EEOC V. CATASTROPHE MANAGEMENT 
SOLUTIONS 
A. The Federal District Court Decision 
1. CHASTITY JONES’ HAIR STORY 
In 2010, Chastity Jones applied for a customer service repre-
sentative position with Catastrophe Management Solutions 
(“CMS”), an Alabama-based insurance claims processing com-
pany.96 In this position, she would man phone calls in a call center.97 
Based on her online application, Ms. Jones, along with numerous 
other applicants, was invited by CMS to participate in a group inter-
view.98 To the interview, she wore a blue business suit99 and her 
locked blonde hair in a curly formation also known as “curli-
locks.”100 After a successful group interview and an individual in-
terview with a company trainer who reviewed the job responsibili-
ties and her ability to perform them, CMS offered Ms. Jones the 
job.101 Shortly thereafter, CMS’ Human Resources manager an-
nounced to the successful applicants the schedule for lab tests and 
the completion of paper work that needed to take place before they 
began working.102 The Human Resources manager informed the 
new hires that they could meet with her individually about any con-
flicts they may have.103 At no point during the group sessions or the 
individual meeting with the trainer, did any CMS representative 
comment on Ms. Jones’ hair.104 
                                                                                                             
 96 See EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL 
7210059, at *1 (11th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016). 
 97 See id. 
 98 See id. 
 99 See id. 
 100 Mark Fijman, EEOC Lawsuit Over Dreadlocks Sparks Criticism and High-
lights Issues with Workplace Grooming Policies, MARTINDALE.COM (Oct. 11, 
2013), https://www.martindale.com/labor-employment-law/article_Phelps-Dun-
bar-LLP_1993564.htm. 
 101 See Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 2016 WL 7210059 at *2. 
 102 See id. 
 103 See id. 
 104 See id. 
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Per instructions, Ms. Jones spoke with the Human Resources 
manager about a scheduling conflict and the Human Resources man-
ager granted her request to take the lab tests on a different day.105 
As Ms. Jones was preparing to depart, the Human Resources man-
ager asked Ms. Jones if her hair were “dreadlocks.”106 Ms. Jones 
confirmed that her curly “look” was in fact locks, to which the Hu-
man Resources manager replied that she was unable to hire her “with 
the dreadlocks.”107 Naturally, Ms. Jones inquired why her locks 
were problematic.108 The Human Resources manager responded, 
“they tend to get messy, although I’m not saying yours are, but you 
know what I’m talking about.”109 The Human Resources manager 
also confided that previously, CMS asked a Black male applicant to 
cut off his locks as a condition of employment, implying that Ms. 
Jones would, too, have to cut off her hair.110 Ms. Jones indicated that 
she would not cut her hair; immediately thereafter CMS’ Human 
Resources manager rescinded the job offer and requested that Ms. 
Jones return the paperwork provided earlier.111 Ms. Jones returned 
the paperwork and left the premises.112 Though CMS’ Human Re-
sources manager did not inform Ms. Jones of a formal policy pro-
hibiting locks, CMS did have a grooming policy in place which ad-
vised that “[a]ll personnel are expected to be dressed and groomed 
in a manner that projects a professional and businesslike image 
while adhering to company and industry standards and/or guide-
lines . . . .[H]airstyles should reflect a business/professional image. 
No excessive hairstyles or unusual colors are acceptable[.]”113 
                                                                                                             
 105 See id. 
 106 See id. 
 107 See id. 
 108 See id. 
 109 See id. 
 110 See id. 
 111 See id. 
 112 See id. 
 113 See id. 
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2. THE EEOC’S LEGAL ARGUMENTS: SOME THINGS OLD, SOME 
THINGS NEW 
On behalf of Ms. Jones, the EEOC challenged CMS’ “no locks” 
hiring practice as a form of intentional race discrimination in viola-
tion of Title VII.114 Armed with over thirty years of legal precedent 
supporting the proposition that workplace proscriptions against 
Black women’s braided hair are beyond the scope of Title VII, CMS 
sought a dismissal of the EEOC’s case.115 In response, the EEOC 
revived Renee Rodgers’ contention that mutable characteristics like 
hair are central to Ms. Jones’ subjective understanding of her racial 
identity.116 The EEOC maintained that “[b]ecause of the historical 
truths and experiences of African Americans, it is only prudent for 
courts to recognize that African-American hair identity is rooted in 
African tradition. As such, natural [hair] styles are as much of a de-
terminate of racial identity as melanoid skin.”117 Lastly, the EEOC 
offered to present expert testimony to substantiate that “the wearing 
of dreadlocks by Blacks has socio-cultural racial significance.”118 
The EEOC also advanced novel legal theories to confront the 
long-standing strict application of the immutability doctrine in race-
based grooming code discrimination cases.119 On the one hand, the 
EEOC sought to discontinue its application by offering a more ex-
pansive notion of race.120 Alternatively, the EEOC sought to demon-
strate how a dreadlocks ban triggers the biological underpinnings of 
                                                                                                             
 114 See id. at *1. 
 115 See id. 
 116 See id. at *2–3. Relatedly, the EEOC asserted that the concept of race does 
not simply embody immutable characteristics, see id. at *2; thus, Title VII’s pro-
hibitions against race discrimination proscribes “employment discrimination 
against a person because of cultural characteristics often linked to race or ethnic-
ity, such as a person’s name, cultural dress and grooming practices, accent or 
manner of speech,” id. at *10 (quoting the EEOC Compliance Manual, § 15–II, at 
4 (2006)). 
 117 Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions’ 
Motion to Dismiss at 8, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d 
(2014) (No. 13-cv-00476-CB-M), 2014 WL 4745282, at *13 [hereinafter Plain-
tiff’s Brief]. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See id. at 11–12. 
 120 See id. 
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the immutability doctrine.121 Both of these new legal arguments 
were informed in part by the legal scholarship of critical race theo-
rists.122 First, the EEOC posited that the immutability doctrine is 
rooted in a discredited view of race as a fixed, biological construct 
and not reflective of Congress’ legislative intent.123 Academics have 
persuasively demonstrated that race is not a fixed, biological truth 
but rather a social construction.124 In order to legitimize and facili-
tate a racial hierarchy as well as individual and systematic acts of 
racial oppression and exclusion—like racial slavery, racial apart-
heid, and racially motivated violence—social, political, and legal 
actors actively fostered notions of race and racial difference as in-
heritable and fixed.125 As a consequence of both orchestrated at-
tempts to characterize, as well as subconscious mapping, race has 
never been limited to one’s ancestry or one’s skin color. Historically 
and contemporarily, mutable characteristics like one’s hair texture, 
dress, name, or accent have also been treated as signifying racial 
identity by both law and society.126 Consequently, mutable charac-
teristics like hair are continuously racialized in law and society even 
                                                                                                             
 121 See id. at 2. 
 122 See id. at 10. 
 123 See id. at 6. 
 124 See, e.g., Ian Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Obser-
vations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1994) (explaining “[t]here are no genetic characteristics 
possessed by all Blacks but not by non-Blacks; similarly, there is no gene or clus-
ter of genes common to all Whites but not to non-Whites”). 
 125 See, e.g., Perkins v. Lake Cty. Dep’t of Utilities, 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1271 
(N.D. Ohio 1994) (“Regrettably, racial classifications may be, and traditionally 
have been, used to justify the exploitation of certain groups”); see also Christian 
B. Sundquist, Science Fictions and Racial Fable: Navigating the Final Frontier 
of Genetic Interpretation, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 57, 57 (2009) (explaining 
“[t]he perception that race should be defined in terms of genetic and biological 
difference fueled the ‘race science’ of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
during which time geneticists, physiognomists, eugenicists, anthropologists and 
others purported to find scientific justification for denying equal treatment to non-
white persons”). 
 126 As Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig and I have both noted, during the 
era of racial slavery, one’s hair texture marked an individual as either presump-
tively free or enslaveable. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Ex-
ploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1100 (2010) 
(“[H]air served as the true signifier of race in early racial trials” and served to 
determine whether women “were American Indian and free, rather than black and 
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when such characteristics “‘are not ‘uniquely’ or ‘exclusively’ ‘per-
formed’ by or are attributed to a particular racial group.”127 In earlier 
work, I have posited that race should be viewed as a socio-legal con-
struct, acknowledging the ways in which law and society have af-
fixed and continue to affix racial meanings and associations to mu-
table and immutable characteristics.128 Therefore, I have urged 
courts to employ a broader understanding of race so that anti-dis-
crimination law can attend to the deeper dimensions of racializa-
tion.129 Informed by my work130 and the scholarship of foundational 
critical race theorists like Professor Paulette Caldwell131 the EEOC 
urged the court to adopt a social constructionist understanding of 
race and thus recognize that CMS’ prohibition against locks fit 
within the purview of Title VII, as locks, like afros, twists, and 
braids have been, and continue to be, associated with Blackness.132 
The EEOC further submitted that by conferring absolute deference 
to employers’ blanket prohibitions against locks—policies which fa-
cially apply to all employees regardless of race, yet almost exclu-
sively regulate the hair of Black employees—“courts generally have 
licensed employers to enforce a racial hierarchy that sanctions hair-
styles and appearance associated with whites and outlaws those as-
sociated with Blacks.”133 
In addition to stressing the ways in which African descendant 
women’s naturally textured hair shape their personal identification 
as Black women as well as the ways in which law and society have 
marked them as Black on the basis of their hair, the EEOC posited 
                                                                                                             
enslaved.”); see also Greene, What’s Hair, supra note 84, at 1366. (explaining 
how a Virginia court in 1806 declared that despite one’s skin color or other phys-
ical characteristics that would signify whiteness, the propensity of one’s hair tex-
ture to become “woolly” or “kinky” marked an individual as an African descend-
ant and presumptively enslaveable). 
 127 See Plaintiff’s Brief, supra note 117, at 10 (quoting What’s Hair, supra 
note 84, at 1386). 
 128 See generally, What’s Hair, supra note 84, at 1359; see also Categorically 
Black, White, or Wrong, supra note 43, at 133–35. 
 129 See, e.g., What’s Hair, supra note 84, at 1393–94. 
 130 See id; Black Women Can’t Have Blonde Hair, supra note 67. 
 131 Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of 
Race and Gender, 40 DUKE L.J. 365, 379 (1991) [hereinafter A Hair Piece]. 
 132 See Plaintiff’s Brief, supra note 117, at 10. 
 133 See id. at 12–13. 
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an equally novel legal argument—one that emphasized the physio-
logical qualities of Black women’s hair.134 Indeed, this argument 
draws upon the influential scholarship of Professor Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig.135 The EEOC highlighted Rogers and subsequent 
courts’ lack of recognition that the hair textures with which many, 
if not most, African descendant women are born allows them to 
more easily lock, twist, and braid their hair, unlike most women who 
identify as white.136 The EEOC explained that “both [afros and 
braids] are ways of styling natural [chemically] unprocessed 
hair.”137 Consequently, “[t]here is no principled or legal distinction 
between policies prohibiting Afros and policies prohibiting dread-
locks. . . . [i]t is thus disingenuous to distinguish between natural 
hair growth as immutable and natural hairstyles as mutable. They 
are inextricably linked.”138 The EEOC submitted that it would pre-
sent expert witness testimony that would confirm: 1) African de-
scendants are the primary wearers of dreadlocks;139 2) locks “are a 
reasonable and natural method of managing the physiological con-
struct of Black hair”; and 3) dreadlocks are an immutable character-
istic, unlike hair length or other hairstyles.”140 
Significantly, for the first time in litigation challenging employ-
ers’ hyper-regulation of African descendant women’s hair, the 
EEOC brought to light the burdens and consequences Black women 
uniquely encounter when conforming to grooming policies that pro-
scribe natural hairstyles.141 In its First Amended Complaint, the 
                                                                                                             
 134 See id. at 11. The EEOC also posited that the ban against locks was moti-
vated by a particular stereotype that African descendants’ natural hair is “uncon-
ventional, unprofessional and/or not sufficiently conservative.” See id. at 12. 
Therefore, CMS’ enactment and implementation of the grooming policy consti-
tuted unlawful racial stereotyping in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins wherein the court held that evidence of supervisors’ 
reliance upon conscious gender stereotypes about how a woman candidate should 
dress, wear her hair, and behave to deny her a promotion can establish Title VII 
liability. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 258. 
 135 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 126, at 1100. 
 136 See Plaintiff’s Brief, supra note 117, at 11. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 13. 
 140 Id. 
 141 See EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL 
7210059, at *2–5 (11th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016). 
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EEOC explained that workplace prohibitions against locks, twists, 
and braids effectively require African descendant women to wear 
straightened hair by donning hair weaves, wigs, or hair extensions, 
along with applying chemical relaxers and/or extreme heat to their 
hair.142 The EEOC pointed out that these methods of achieving and 
maintaining straightened hair can be expensive, time-consuming, 
and damaging to Black women’s physical well-being.143 Doing so 
can also be damaging to Black women’s emotional well-being.144 
Indeed, Black women may experience conforming to a straightened 
hairstyle as an inauthentic “identity performance,” which Professors 
Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have explained “can be at odds with 
the employee’s sense of identity [and thus,] to the extent the em-
ployee’s continued existence and success in the workplace is con-
tingent upon her behaving in ways that operate as a denial of self, 
there is continual harm to that employee’s dignity.”145 
Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig has enumerated the ways in 
which wearing one’s naturally textured hair relieves Black women 
of  significant financial and temporal burdens that accompany don-
ning straight hair via the use of permanent relaxers, temporary 
straightening agents, hair extensions or wigs, which can result in ir-
reparable hair and/or scalp damage.146 Professor Onwuachi-Willig 
has also highlighted the negative psychological costs that Black 
women endure to conform to a raced and gendered beauty norm of 
donning straight hair.147 Moreover, fulfilling a straightened hairstyle 
mandate or expectation can be not only harmful to one’s emotional 
                                                                                                             
 142 First Amended Complaint, supra note 94. 
 143 Id. 
 144 ALEXIS MCGILL JOHNSON ET AL., PERCEPTION INST., THE “GOOD HAIR” 
STUDY: EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT ATTITUDES TOWARD BLACK WOMEN’S HAIR 11 
(2017), https://perception.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/TheGood-HairStudy
FindingsReport.pdf. 
 145 Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 719-28 (2001). 
 146 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 126, at 1112–20. 
 147 Id. A recent Google search for “unprofessional hairstyles for women” pri-
marily generated pictures of Black women donning natural hairstyles whereas a 
search for “professional styles for women” yielded pictures of white women with 
straightened coiffed hairstyles. Leigh Alexander, Do Google’s “Unprofessional 
Hair” Results Show It Is Racist?, GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2016, 3:50 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/08/does-google-unprofes-
sional-hair-results-prove-algorithms-racist-. 
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well-being, but also to one’s physical health.148 In Dr. Nadia 
Brown’s enlightening study examining how Black female legisla-
tors navigate colleagues’ and constituents’ expectations that they 
don straightened hair, two legislators admitted that they purpose-
fully avoided physical activities that might cause their hair to “‘re-
vert back’ to its natural state.”149 The following findings of a more 
recent study, The “Good Hair” Study: Explicit and Implicit Atti-
tudes Toward Black Women’s Hair, published in February 2017 by 
the Perception Institute, further substantiates the EEOC’s legal ar-
guments: 
 Black women are more likely to report spending 
more time on their hair than white women; 
 Black women are more likely to report having 
professional styling appointments more often 
than white women; 
 Black women are more likely to spend more 
money on products for their hair than white 
women; 
 Black women reported high levels of anxiety 
about their hair and greater levels of anxiety than 
white women reported; 
 Of those surveyed, twice as many Black women 
feel social pressure to straighten their hair for 
work; and 
 Three times as many Black women than white 
women report that they disengage in exercise and 
other physical activities because of their hair in 
                                                                                                             
 148 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 126, at 1116–18. 
 149 Nadia Brown, “It’s More than Hair . . . That’s Why You Should Care”: 
The Politics of Appearance for Black Women State Legislators, 2 POL., GROUPS, 
AND IDENTITIES 295, 304 (2014). 
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light of the significant monetary and temporal in-
vestment alongside the heightened professional 
and social pressures to maintain straight hair.150 
The Perception Institute’s timely study confirms insights I have 
shared in earlier work: 
Black women’s deliberations over their hair may be 
shared to a certain extent by all women; however, the 
extent to which these decisions are emotional, per-
sonal, political, and professional (and often driven by 
fears of the resulting consequences) are unique to the 
Black women’s experience—historically and con-
temporarily. This experience is deeply rooted in 
American constructs of race, racism, and racial hier-
archy out of which a particular negative stigmatiza-
tion of Black women’s hair and resulting separation, 
discrimination, and marginalization manifested in 
both private and public spheres.151 
The EEOC made visible this under-discussed or unknown expe-
rience of many Black women like Chastity Jones; the onus placed 
upon Black women to satisfy an employer’s requirement or prefer-
ence for straightened hair is often substantial. Therefore, when a 
Black woman dons her naturally textured hair and thus does not as-
sume the additional financial, temporal, and health-related burdens 
to comply with this condition of employment—unrelated to her job 
performance or ability—a direct violation of Title VII’s plain lan-
guage results: she is deprived of employment opportunities for 
which she is qualified on the basis of her race and gender.152 Ac-
                                                                                                             
 150 JOHNSON, supra note 144, at 11. 
 151 See Black Women Can’t Have Blonde Hair, supra note 67, at 406–07. 
 152 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 94, at ¶ 31.; see also What Not 
to Wear in the Workplace, supra note 40, at 365 (positing that disqualifying Afri-
can descendant women from employment opportunities when they don their nat-
ural hair “arbitrarily deprives or tends to deprive [Black women from the] acqui-
sition and maintenance of employment for which they are qualified in violation 
of Title VII’s plain language”). 
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cordingly, the EEOC argued Ms. Jones and other Black women con-
sequently suffer “a penalty for employment that White [female] ap-
plicants and employees are not required to endure.”153 
3. THE DISTRICT COURT’S ANALYSIS: AFROS ARE RACIAL BUT 
LOCKS ARE CULTURAL 
Upon reviewing the motions of the EEOC and Catastrophe Man-
agement Solutions, the federal district court rejected the well-sup-
ported social constructionist view of race, and once again applied 
the biologically rooted immutability doctrine to conclude that the 
EEOC could never put forth an actionable race discrimination 
case.154 First, according to the court, adopting a broader notion of 
race would lead to “absurd results” because both white and Black 
employees who donned locks could challenge the application of 
CMS’ grooming policy.155 Strictly adhering to the immutability doc-
trine and the beliefs that informed it, the district court in Catastrophe 
Management Solutions endorsed the idea that CMS’ subjective 
grooming policy could not be race-based if individuals who did not 
share the same racial identity can be subject to its enforcement.156 
                                                                                                             
 153 See Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 7, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. So-
lutions, No. 14-13482, (11th Cir. Oct. 31, 2016) [hereinafter Petition for Rehear-
ing]. . 
 154 EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL 7210059, 
at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016). In making this argument, the EEOC relied upon 
the scholarship of critical race legal theorists and the guidance in its Compliance 
Manual which states that the “concept of race encompasses cultural characteristics 
related to race and ethnicity [including] grooming practices.” See also supra n. 44 
(highlighting the decision of the Chicago Commission on Human Relations that 
barring the entry of African descendant male patrons because they donned braids 
constituted unlawful race discrimination in part because it recognized braids as a 
“disfavored a hairstyle associated with one racial group based on stereotypical 
assumptions about wearers of the hairstyle, imposing an additional burden on that 
group in order to enjoy the full use of the public accommodations it offered”). 
Notably, the Commission considered legal scholarship in developing its opinion. 
See Constance Dionne Russell, Styling Civil Rights: The Effect of S 1981 and the 
Public Accommodations Act on Black Women’s Access to White Stylists and Sa-
lons, 24 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 189 (2008); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 126; 
Greene, What’s Hair, supra note 84. 
 155 EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1143 (S.D. 
Ala. 2014). 
 156 Id. at 1143–44. 
1016 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:987 
 
However, this is a very restrictive view of Title VII’s scope of pro-
tection.157 For example, if an employer banned white employees 
from wearing locks but allowed Black employees to do so, the for-
mer would have an actionable Title VII claim.158 Such evidence is a 
textbook example of intentional race discrimination or differential 
treatment on the basis of race. Furthermore, if an employer ex-
pressed that donning locks were “too Black,”159 evidence that this 
racial stereotype consciously motivated a negative employment ac-
tion would establish a violation of Title VII regardless of the racial 
identity of the lock wearer.160 Accordingly, statutory protection gen-
erally is not dictated by the identity of the complainant, but rather, 
the impermissible conduct of the covered employer.161 
Guided by the immutability doctrine, the district court also de-
clared that “Title VII does not protect against discrimination based 
on traits, even a trait that has sociocultural racial significance.”162 
                                                                                                             
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Professor Paulette Caldwell explained in her seminal work: 
[T]he rationalizations that accompanied opposition to 
Afro hairstyles in the 1960s—extreme, too unusual, not busi-
nesslike, inconsistent with a conservative image, unprofes-
sional, inappropriate with business attire, too ”black” 
(i.e., too militant), unclean—are used today to justify the cate-
gorical exclusion of braided hairstyles [and other natural hair-
styles adorned by African descendants] in many parts of the 
workforce, particularly in jobs that are either traditionally con-
servative or highly structured, involve close immediate super-
vision, or require significant contact with the public. 
Caldwell, supra note 47, at 384–85 (emphasis added).  
 160 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 161 Id.; But see, e.g., Jackson v. Deen, 959 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1354 (S.D. Ga. 
Aug. 12, 2013) (holding that a female plaintiff who identified as white did not 
have standing to challenge discriminatory comments directed toward and made 
about African American employees and segregation of African American employ-
ees in the workplace because she was “not an aggrieved party under Title VII” 
since none of the “racially offensive comments [and segregationist policies] were 
either directed toward [her] or made with the intent to harass her.”). 
 162 Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1144. See generally Juan 
F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin” Discrimina-
tion Under Title VII, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 805, 810 (1994). (examining the 
overlapping nature of race and ethnicity). 
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Relying upon Seventh Circuit precedent, the court pontificated “cul-
ture and race are two distinct concepts [. . . ] [c]ulture is ‘a set of 
behavioral characteristics and therefore significantly dissimilar 
from the immutable characteristics of race and national 
origin.’”163[L1] The district court thereby reiterated that an afro is an 
immutable, racial characteristic protected against discrimination, 
whereas the unimpeded growth of an afro like locks is a mutable, 
cultural characteristic beyond the scope of Title VII protection.164 It 
opined that “a hairstyle is not inevitable and immutable just because 
it is a reasonable result of hair texture, which is an immutable char-
acteristic.”165 The court emphatically declared that “no amount of 
expert testimony can change the fact that dreadlocks is a hair-
style.”166 Yet, the court suggested that CMS’ prohibition against 
locks could transform from a matter of permissible cultural discrim-
ination into one of impermissible race discrimination if the EEOC’s 
expert witnesses could demonstrate “Blacks are the exclusive wear-
ers of dreadlocks.”167 Thus, by treating afros as legally protected 
hair texture and any other configuration of afro hair texture as le-
gally unprotected hairstyles, the court literally split hairs to preserve 
four decades of legal precedent protecting the former.168 
Ultimately, the federal district court in Catastrophe Manage-
ment Solutions dismissed the EEOC’s complaint and request to 
amend the original complaint, holding that the EEOC could not 
bring a plausible claim of intentional race discrimination.169 Proce-
durally and substantively, the court constricted the possibility of in-
itiating a viable race-based grooming codes discrimination case.170 
                                                                                                             
   163    Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1144. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. (emphasis added). 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at 1142–43. 
 169 Id. at 1144; Order Denying Motion to Amend Complaint, EEOC v. Catas-
trophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 13-00476-CB-M (S.D. Ala. Jun. 2, 2014). 
 170 Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1141. On a motion to dis-
miss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district 
court dismissed the EEOC’s Title VII intentional race discrimination employing 
the Supreme Court’s heightened “plausibility” pleading standard adopted in Bell 
Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662 (2009). By dismissing the EEOC’s complaint the court held that based upon 
the allegations asserted in the EEOC’s original and amended complaints, the 
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The federal district court foreclosed the opportunity for plaintiffs to: 
1) engage in meaningful discovery to the uncover the motivations 
for and application of a “no-locks” policy; 2) produce expert witness 
testimony to educate the court on African descendants’ naturally 
textured hair and the racial dynamics of workplace prohibitions 
against natural hair; and 3) pursue a cognizable theory of intentional 
race discrimination which permits plaintiffs to produce evidence of 
the disparate race-based burdens in complying with a “neutral” 
grooming policy.171 Thus, more expressly than the Rogers court, the 
district court in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions sig-
naled to employers that they may not condition a Black woman’s 
employment upon changing her natural hair texture when worn short 
but that they are authorized to do so under any other circum-
stances.172 
B. The Eleventh Circuit Decision 
In 2014, the EEOC appealed the district court’s decision to the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Notably, the Eleventh Circuit 
entertained the EEOC’s appeal in the wake of public controversy 
                                                                                                             
EEOC could not establish a plausible claim of intentional race discrimination nor 
could it engage in discovery to uncover additional evidence to establish its claims. 
Consequently, the courts’ decisions in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solu-
tions presents important substantive and procedural issues specific to employment 
discrimination cases in need of addressing. See e.g., Suzette Malveaux, Front 
Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Det-
rimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 
67–68 (2010) (arguing “[c]ourt’s new plausibility pleading standard, is more out-
come determinative for civil rights cases because of the informational inequity 
that exists between the parties and the evidentiary hurdles that exist for such 
claims . . . [and] [p]laintiffs alleging intentional discrimination are at a distinct 
evidentiary disadvantage pre-discovery because of the difficulty in uncovering 
facts sufficient to demonstrate illegal motive”). 
 171 Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1144. See generally Jes-
persen v. Harrah’s Oper. Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1108–09 (9th Cir. 2006) (ar-
ticulating the undue burdens analysis that can be used establish intentional dis-
crimination violative of Title VII if a plaintiff can demonstrate that compliance 
with an employer’s grooming policy results in more onerous burdens on a group 
of individuals on the basis of a protected trait like sex or race). 
 172 Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1142–43. Unless there is 
evidence that individuals were treated differently on the basis of race or that the 
employer consciously crafted the policy to exclude individuals on the basis of 
race. 
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surrounding the United States Army’s grooming policy that barred 
natural hairstyles commonly and traditionally worn by African de-
scendant servicewomen like two-strand twists, locks, braids, and af-
ros.173 The regulation also referred to these hairstyles as “matted and 
unkempt.”174 Strikingly, the same demeaning stereotypes about 
Black women’s naturally textured hair that CMS verbally commu-
nicated to Ms. Jones as the rationale for its informal “no locks” pol-
icy motivated the Army’s written natural hairstyle ban.175 Though 
any person’s hair can become unkempt, matted, or messy, both em-
ployers treated the unimpeded growth of Black women’s hair as 
uniquely susceptible to being disheveled or unclean and thereby pe-
nalized Black women who grew their naturally textured hair long or 
wore it in more efficient or subjectively pleasing formations like 
twists, locks, or braids.176 Upon reconsideration, Secretary of De-
fense Hagel and other military leaders agreed with the female mem-
                                                                                                             
 173 See Rhodan, supra note 17. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. See also Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1140. 
 176 See Rhodan, supra note 17. Unfortunately, the punishment Black women 
endure for simply wearing their natural hair is not limited to adulthood or their 
professional experiences; the penalties they suffer with impunity often begin dur-
ing childhood. During the span of one week in the spring of 2017, private school 
administrators in Florida and Massachusetts punished African descendant girls for 
donning their hair in afros and braids respectively. http://www.wctv.tv/con-
tent/news/Local-teen-told-cant-wear-hairstyle-at-school-423232994.html 
https://www.yahoo.com/style/time-stop-hair-policing-children-143201370.html. 
http://www.fox32chicago.com/news/254824241-story. These recent incidences 
of race-based grooming codes discrimination in the education context illustrate 
the tangible impact of judicial decisions like Rogers v. American Airlines and 
EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions. In its public statement defending 
the decisions to proscribe synthetic braids and discipline twin sisters for refusing 
to remove their braids, the private school in Massachusetts cited federal precedent 
authorizing parallel workplace prohibitions as legal support. Alluding to the race-
immutability/culture-mutability distinction the federal judiciary has maintained in 
the workplace context, the school’s administration expressly stated, “[s]ome have 
asserted that our prohibition on artificial hair extensions violates a ‘cultural right,’ 
but that view is not supported by the courts, which distinguish between policies 
that affect a person’s natural ‘immutable’ characteristics and those that prohibit 
practices based on changeable cultural norms.”http://www.newsweek.com/
malden-ma-dress-code-charter-school-policy-613691?utm_content=buffer953
da&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer 
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bership of the Congressional Black Caucus, finding that the mili-
tary’s proscriptions were not simply offensive, but also racially dis-
criminatory.177 The United States Army and the United States Air 
Force removed the bans against Black servicewomen’s natural hair-
styles as well as accompanying, derogatory descriptors from their 
grooming policies.178 
In its appellate brief, the EEOC situated CMS’ workplace ban 
within broader social context, noting the U.S. military’s apprecia-
tion of: the intersectional dimensions of its natural hair bans; the un-
equal burdens these grooming mandates imposed upon African de-
scendant servicewomen to obtain and maintain their employment; 
and the irrelevance of Black women’s hair to their serving and pro-
tecting our country. Thus, just as the United States military acknowl-
edged the racially discriminatory nature of its grooming policy, the 
EEOC implored that the time was ripe for the federal judiciary to 
reconsider its rigid stance in race-based challenges against parallel 
natural hair bans instituted by private employers. The EEOC main-
tained: 
[e]ven the Army, Navy and Air Force, which are 
known for strict uniform standards governing mili-
tary appearance, have revised their recent bans on 
dreadlocks, cornrows, and braids after receiving nu-
merous complaints indicating that the service-level 
grooming policies were racially biased against Black 
women who choose to wear their hair in natural hair-
styles rather than to use heat or chemicals to 
straighten the hair or wigs to cover it.179 
                                                                                                             
 177 Rhodan, supra note 17. 
 178 In January 2017, the Army’s ban against twists, locks, and braids adorned 
by African descendant servicewomen was effectively reversed yet the policy con-
tinues to impose burdensome and subjective conditions for compliance, requiring 
twists, braids, and locks to have a “uniform dimension; have a diameter no greater 
than a half-inch; and present a neat, professional and well-groomed appearance.” 
Zeba Blay, U.S. Army Lifts Ban on Dreadlocks, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2017, 
4:31 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/us-army-lifts-ban-on-dread-
locks_us_589e1cfee4b03df370d64723 (updated Feb. 21, 2017). 
 179 Brief of the EEOC as Plaintiff-Appellant, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. So-
lutions, 837 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-13482), 2014 WL 4795874. 
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Though the three-judge panel recognized Ms. Jones’ “intensely 
personal” nature of wearing locks and Ms. Jones’ refusal to cut 
them, it was not persuaded by the military’s decision to rescind its 
grooming policies. Rather, the court amplified employers’ legal 
right to engage in the hyper-regulation of African descendant 
women’s bodies via their hair. 
A little over a year after oral arguments, the three-judge panel 
issued its first opinion followed by a revised opinion in December 
2016.180 Notably, the panel first addressed the EEOC’s theory of li-
ability. It concluded that by describing the consequences of a “no 
locks” policy with terms like “impact,” “disadvantage,” and “ad-
verse effects” during oral arguments and in its complaints, the 
EEOC conflated the disparate impact and disparate treatment theo-
ries of liability.181 Thus, the panel did not consider the EEOC’s al-
legations concerning the burdens or consequences that the locks ban 
imposed upon Black women like Ms. Jones as such allegations 
seemingly cannot support a claim of intentional race discrimina-
tion.182 The panel asserted that it would focus its analysis on 
“whether the protected trait actually motivated the employer’s deci-
sion.”183 To answer this query, similarly to the court below, the 
Eleventh Circuit applied a restrictive definition of an immutable 
characteristic previously articulated in circuit decisions, concluding 
that a “protected trait” under Title VII is one that an individual “is 
born with or cannot change.”184 The court also expressed that the 
                                                                                                             
 180 EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sol., 837 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2016), with-
drawn and superseded by, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL 7210059 (11th Cir. Dec. 13, 
2016). 
 181 Id. at 9–14. 
 182 A plaintiff is not precluded from articulating the burdens, consequences, or 
impact of an employment practice in an intentional discrimination case nor does 
doing so compel the automatic application of a disparate impact theory of liability. 
Title VII’s plain language does not require such a line of demarcation between 
disparate treatment and disparate impact. Furthermore, a litigant should not be 
confined to a particular set of allegations or evidence in order to state an actiona-
ble claim of unlawful discrimination. A litigant should be able to support her 
claim with allegations or evidence that illuminates the injury or harm that results 
from an employment practice. See id. 
 183 Id. at 14 (citing Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (ellip-
ses and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 184 Id. at 21 (citing Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1389 
(11th Cir. 1998); Gilchrist v. Bolger, 733 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1984). 
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specific focus of Title VII’s prohibitions against discrimination are 
“matters that are either beyond the victim’s power to alter or that 
impose a burden on an employee on one of the prohibited bases.”185 
The Eleventh Circuit reiterated the district court’s hair splitting 
demarcation between impermissible and permissible regulation of 
African descendants’ hair.186 According to the panel, “discrimina-
tion on the basis of black hair texture (an immutable characteristic) 
is prohibited by Title VII, while adverse action on the basis of black 
hairstyle (a mutable choice) is not.”187 To derive this holding, the 
panel in part rigidly applied nearly four decades of legal precedent, 
explaining that “the distinction between and mutable characteristics 
of race can sometimes be a fine (and difficult one), but it is a line 
that courts have drawn.”188 The panel distinguished the Rogers de-
cision denying Renee Rodgers statutory protection for discrimina-
tion against her braids from another federal district court recogniz-
ing a Black woman’s intentional race discrimination claim when she 
was denied a promotion because she donned an afro.189 As a result, 
the Eleventh Circuit ruled that in order for locks to be deemed a 
racial characteristic as opposed to a cultural characteristic, the 
EEOC (and plaintiffs to follow) would have to allege that locks were 
not a function of personal choice, but rather that all, and/or only, 
individuals who identify as African descendants donned locks or are 
born with them.190 As Professor Ian Haney Lopez has explained 
“[t]here are no genetic characteristics possessed by all Blacks but 
not by non-Blacks; similarly, there is no gene or cluster of genes 
common to all Whites but not to non-Whites.”191 Therefore, it is im-
possible for a race discrimination plaintiff to produce evidence that 
the proscribed trait is exclusively adorned by individuals who share 
the same racial identity.192 By establishing an unfulfillable eviden-
tiary standard, the court significantly departed from the Rogers 
                                                                                                             
 185 Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 837 F.3d at 22 (quoting Willingham v. Ma-
con Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975)). 
 186 Id. at 24. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. (citing Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins. Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 168 
(7th Cir. 1976)). 
 190 Id. 
 191 Lopez, supra note 124, at 11. 
 192 See id. 
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court, which hypothesized an actionable race-based grooming codes 
discrimination case if it were shown that predominantly Black peo-
ple adorn braids.193 Thus, with this heightened evidentiary standard, 
the Eleventh Circuit (like the district court) signaled that workplace 
discrimination against racialized, mutable characteristics would 
never implicate Title VII protection. 
It is important to note that unlike the district court, the Eleventh 
Circuit examined the query: what is race?194 The three-judge panel 
engaged the work of race and law scholars who have posited that 
race is a social construct “rather than an absolute biological 
truth.”195 Acknowledging the persuasiveness of these scholarly ar-
guments, the panel nonetheless maintained that the current defini-
tion of race be guided by the outdated (arguably biological) under-
standing of race in 1964 when the Civil Rights Act became law.196 
To discern how Congress might have understood the concept of race 
when it enacted Title VII, the court reviewed dictionary entries pub-
lished in the 1960s.197 It surmised that race “referred to common 
physical characteristics shared by a group of people and transmitted 
by their ancestors over time.”198 Noting that none of the sources ex-
amined used the term “immutable” in defining race, the panel still 
maintained, “it is not a linguistic stretch to think that [racial] char-
acteristics are a matter of birth, and not culture.”199 To the panel, an 
interpretive rule like the immutability doctrine which limits protec-
tion against race discrimination to characteristics with which one is 
born is sound and logical. However, the Eleventh Circuit compli-
cated the race-immutability/culture-mutability distinction that pre-
vious courts constructed to deny statutory protection in race-based 
grooming codes discrimination cases. Applying this framework, the 
panel denominated afros a “black hair texture” and locks a “black 
hairstyle” despite recognizing the EEOC’s claim that Ms. Jones’ 
                                                                                                             
 193 See Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. at 1143; Rogers v. Am. Air-
lines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 194 Id. at 15–18. 
 195 Id. at 18. 
 196 Id. at 18–19. 
 197 Id. at 16–18. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. at 18. 
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locks are a “natural outgrowth of black hair texture” or the unim-
peded growth of an afro.200 Notably, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 
the lower court’s loose assertion that even though locks are a “‘nat-
ural outgrowth’ of the texture of black hair [it] does not make [locks] 
an immutable characteristic of race.”201 Like the Rogers court, the 
Eleventh Circuit and the district court dictated to Black women what 
their natural hair is and means. Per the court’s reasoning, afros are 
an immutable characteristic of Blackness because either only Afri-
can descendants are born with an afro-like hair texture or those who 
have such hair texture are African descendants. Thus, employer dis-
crimination against afros constitutes unlawful race discrimination. 
Whereas, locks are mutable, cultural characteristics since African 
descendants are neither the exclusive wearers of locks nor are they 
born with them. As such, discrimination against locks falls beyond 
Title VII’s scope of protection. In effect, this puzzling race-immu-
tability/culture-mutability framework the Eleventh Circuit rein-
forced legally defines not only locks but also any other formation of 
textured or curly hair, like braids or twists, as mutable, cultural hair-
styles which employers are free to regulate or prohibit. 
The panel appeared to interpret the arguments of race and law 
scholars who have urged courts to adopt a social constructionist 
view of race as support for this head-scratching conclusion.202 Ac-
cording to the court, “there have been some calls by [legal scholars] 
for courts to interpret Title VII more expansively by eliminating the 
biological conception of ‘race’ and encompassing cultural charac-
teristics associated with race.”203 However, when these legal schol-
ars, including myself, have advocated for courts to treat mutable 
characteristics such as skin color, hair, language, and dress as con-
stitutive of race, it is not simply because they may be culturally sig-
nificant to the wearer. Rather, the scholarship to which the court 
cites for this proposition simply explains that traits with which one 
is born are not the sole characteristics that law and society have used 
to mark one’s racial identity.204 Mutable characteristics have played 
and continue to play a critical role in the external classification of 
                                                                                                             
 200 Id. at 24, 29. 
 201 Id. at 25. 
 202 Id. at 17–20. 
 203 Id. at 30. 
 204 Id. at 6. 
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an individual’s race and attendant discrimination; mutable charac-
teristics also inform individuals’ subjective understanding of their 
racial identity.205 Consequently, legal scholars have urged courts to 
employ a broader notion of race which acknowledges this historic 
and contemporary reality. Moreover, the race-immutability/culture-
mutability distinction that courts have created fails to acknowledge 
the reality that race and culture are overlapping constructs just as 
race and religion or race and national origin can be.206 However, it 
does not follow that because a characteristic can be deemed both 
racial and cultural, an employer’s discrimination against this char-
acteristic falls outside Title VII’s purview. 
III. LOCKED OUT: THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE IMMUTABILITY 
DOCTRINE 
A. Strict Immutability: “A Legal Fiction” 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal’s 1975 decision in Willingham 
v. Macon Telephone Publishing Company shaped the courts’ deci-
sions in Rogers v. American Airlines and EEOC v. Catastrophe 
Management Solutions.207  In Willingham, the Fifth Circuit held that 
a private employer did not engage in unlawful sex discrimination 
when it refused to hire a qualified male applicant as a copy layout 
artist because he donned shoulder length hair.208 In doing so, the 
Fifth Circuit attempted to carve out a definitive sphere of employ-
ment practices that could subject an employer to Title VII liability 
                                                                                                             
 205 Categorically Black, White, or Wrong, supra note 43, at 134. 
 206 See, e.g., Smith v. Specialty Pool Contractors, No. 02:07cv1464, 2008 WL 
4410163 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2008) (denying summary judgment in a Title VII 
race and religious discrimination case where the plaintiff, a practicing Catholic, 
alleged racial and religious harassment because his father is Jewish). See also, 
Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547 F. Supp. 550, 560 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (arguing “the 
notion of “race” as contrasted with national origin is highly dubious”). See Perkins 
v. Lake Cty. Dep’t of Utilities, 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1272 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (argu-
ing courts have engaged in “mental gymnastics” to define race and national origin 
and characterize them as discrete concepts for the purposes of deciding whether a 
plaintiff’s discrimination claims are actionable under federal anti-discrimination 
laws). 
 207 Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); 
EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL 7210059, at *8–
10. 
 208 Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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for unlawful sex or race discrimination and those that employers 
could freely implement without judicial oversight. The court pro-
nounced that: 
[e]qual employment opportunity may be secured 
only when employers are barred from discriminating 
against employees on the basis of immutable charac-
teristics, such as race and national origin. . . . But a 
hiring policy that distinguishes on some other 
ground, such as grooming codes or length of hair, is 
related more closely to the employer’s choice of how 
to run his business than to equality of employment 
opportunity. . . . If the employee objects to the 
grooming code he has the right to reject it by looking 
elsewhere for employment, or alternatively he may 
choose to subordinate his preference by accepting 
the code along with the job.209 
Though it is not supported in Title VII’s plain language, since 
Willingham, the Fifth Circuit’s strict immutability doctrine has 
served as a prerequisite to statutory protection in a variety of civil 
rights cases;210 in the race discrimination context, the immutability 
doctrine has been employed to dismiss cases involving employer 
regulation of mutable characteristics like hair color,211 hairstyles,212 
                                                                                                             
 209 Id. (emphasis added). 
 210 See Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 29 (2015) 
(Explaining “[e]ven though the term immutability does not appear in any employ-
ment discrimination statute, courts have borrowed immutability concepts [from 
the constitutional context] to answer definitional questions about the scope of stat-
utory prohibitions on discrimination”). 
 211 See e.g, Santee v. Windsor Court Hotel Ltd. P’ship, No. Civ.A.99-3891, 
2000 WL 1610775, at *3-4 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2000) (holding that a Black woman 
with dyed blonde hair, who was denied employment because her blonde hair vio-
lated the hotel’s grooming policy banning “extreme” hairstyles, could not estab-
lish a prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII because hair color 
was not an immutable characteristic). 
 212 See, e.g., Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262 
(S.D.N.Y.2002) (dismissing a Black male employee’s Title VII race discrimina-
tion case challenging an employer’s requirement that employees who wore locks 
to cover them with a wool hat because the employee could not demonstrate per 
the immutability doctrine that locks were unique to African descendants). Opinion 
located at: 
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and language213. The immutability doctrine, like other central fea-
tures of anti-discrimination jurisprudence “is not required by the op-
erative language of the federal employment discrimination statutes, 
but flows from the ways in which the courts tend to think. . . . “214 
One can surmise that courts’ conceptualization of race in Rogers v. 
American Airlines and in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solu-
tions is grounded in entrenched perceptions that one’s racial identity 
is a static, biological identity and/or that one’s race is marked by 
immutable physical characteristics, arguably like skin color.215 In-
deed, numerous legal scholars have convincingly demonstrated how 
these notions of identity shape antidiscrimination law. For example, 
Professor Natasha Martin has explained: 
[d]iscrimination law confronts identity as if it were 
static, and this approach has been shown to be inad-
equate in capturing the complexity of identity and the 
perceptions of employees in contemporary work set-
tings. The protected-class approach under Title VII 
has focused largely on the physical embodiment of 
the identity category—the immutable aspects of an 
individual’s identity.216 
                                                                                                             
https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/cchr/DataPor-
talDocs/09P002Feb162011.pdf. 
 213 See, e.g., Kahakua v. Friday, 876 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1989) (unpublished 
table decision), No. 88-1668, 1989 WL 61762, at *3 (9th Cir. June 2, 1989) (de-
clining to decide the issue of whether an employer’s decision was based on plain-
tiffs’ dialect constitutes race and national origin discrimination where plaintiffs 
claimed race and national origin discrimination because they were allegedly de-
nied positions as broadcasters because of their Hawaiian Creole accent or dialect). 
See generally Greene, What’s Hair, supra note 84, at 1369; see also Peter Bran-
don Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination Under 
Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 773 (1987). 
 214 Sandra Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 
101–02 (2011) (critiquing courts’ interpretation of 703(a)(1) of Title VII as pro-
hibiting disparate treatment and 703(a)(2) as prohibiting unintentional discrimi-
nation though such a distinction is unsupported by the text and it frustrates the 
goals of the statute). 
 215 See Categorically Black, White, or Wrong, supra note 43, at 131–36. 
 216 Natasha T. Martin, Diversity and the Virtual Workplace: Performance 
Identity and Shifting Boundaries of Workplace Engagement, 16 LEWIS & CLARK 
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Accordingly, it appears that the strict immutability doctrine is a 
consequence of judicial understanding of identity, namely racial and 
gender identity, as constitutive of fixed, biological characteristics—
despite scholars’ persuasive arguments to the contrary.217 It is there-
fore reasonable to conclude that this concept of immutability em-
braced by the courts in Willingham, Rogers, and Catastrophe Man-
agement Solutions reflects a reflexive understanding of race as a sta-
ble biological construct and in turn, there are inexorably fixed char-
acteristics that denote one’s race. This notion is not extraordinary; 
many adhere to the idea—consciously and unconsciously—that race 
is a fixed, biological construct and characteristics constituting one’s 
racial identity are those with which one is born, inheritable, impos-
sible or difficult to change, and singularly displayed by individuals 
who share the same racial identity.218 Consequently, it seems that 
judges’ endorsement of strict immutability in race-based grooming 
codes discrimination cases is distinctively informed by understand-
ings of racial identity—namely Black identity—as an involuntary, 
genetic, and unchangeable state of being marked by a darker skin 
complexion and textured hair, which contemporary events like Ra-
chel Dolezal’s claim of Blackness complicate.219 Indeed, the Elev-
enth Circuit’s and the district court’s pronouncement in Catastrophe 
                                                                                                             
L. REV. 605, 642 (2012). See also Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immuta-
bility in Employment Discrimination Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483, 1509 
(2011) (arguing that “[t]he concept of immutability has been a fixture in both con-
stitutional and statutory analysis of discrimination issues . . . [and] is a unifying 
principle that satisfactorily explains the protected classifications [covered in em-
ployment discrimination statutes]”). 
 217 See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINNANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (2d ed. 1994); see also Lopez, 
supra note 124, at 11. 
 218 See Categorically Black, White, or Wrong, supra note 43, at 133-36 (2013) 
(recognizing the undetected salience of race as a biological construct within con-
temporary social and legal thinking even though it has been firmly established 
that race is not a genetic but rather a social construct—a construct which has real, 
defining meaning). 
 219 Chris McGreal, Rachel Dolezal: ‘I wasn’t identifying as black to upset peo-
ple. I was being me’, GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2015, 1:00 PM), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/us-news/2015/dec/13/rachel-dolezal-i-wasnt-identifying-as-black-to-up-
set-people-i-was-being-me. I am in no way making a judgment as to whether Ra-
chel Dolezal can stake a legitimate claim to Black American identity. I mention 
her story merely as a contemporary example of racial fluidity. It is also important 
to point out that hair played a critical role in Rachel Dolezal’s self-identification 
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Management Solutions that an afro is “an immutable Black hair tex-
ture,” appears to derive from a belief that African descendants are 
exclusively born with an afro or possess a hair texture that will in-
evitably grow into an afro. Richard Simmons’ afro challenges this 
operating assumption.220 Despite clear evidence to the contrary, 
courts have calcified as fact an evident belief that undergirds the ap-
plication of strict immutability in race discrimination cases chal-
lenging natural hair bans: all and/or only African descendants are 
born with or are capable of adorning afros. Strict immutability, 
therefore, serves as a “legal fiction”: a rule created by judicial, leg-
islative, and political bodies, which is not based in fact, yet is treated 
as such in legitimating zones of protection and inclusion. To satisfy 
the contours of strict immutability articulated in EEOC v. Catastro-
phe Management Solutions, race discrimination plaintiffs challeng-
ing discrimination against mutable characteristics must demonstrate 
one of the following: 1) all individuals or only individuals who share 
a particular racial identity possess the regulated characteristic; 2) the 
regulated characteristic cannot be changed; or 3) the regulated char-
acteristic is one with which an individual is born.221 This heightened 
version of strict immutability superficially narrows the purview of 
                                                                                                             
or portrayal as a Black woman. Over the years, she has covered her naturally 
straight blonde hair by wearing synthetic braids and cornrows along with weaves 
or wigs styled like an afro. 
 220 Richard Simmons is a celebrity fitness guru who identifies as white and is 
widely known for his large red afro. It is important to make clear the fact that 
Richard Simmons dons an afro does not now transform a workplace ban against 
afros into a regulation of a non-racial, cultural characteristic beyond the scope of 
Title VII proscriptions against race discrimination. It merely confirms that there 
is no one characteristic that only individuals who identify as Black or white, for 
example, possess. See Lopez, supra note 124, at 11 (explaining “[t]here are no 
genetic characteristics possessed by all Blacks but not by non-Blacks; similarly, 
there is no gene or cluster of genes common to all Whites but not to non-Whites”). 
Therefore, more accurate bases for conferring statutory protection to employer 
regulation of afros are that law and society link afros to African ancestry and Af-
rican descendants often wear afros as an expression of their racial identity like 
locks, twists, and braids. 
 221 See generally EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 11 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 
1144 (S.D. Ala. 2014) (holding that the dreadlocked hair style was a mutable char-
acteristic because “Blacks are not the exclusive wearers of dreadlocks”) (emphasis 
in original). 
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protection against race discrimination under current anti-discrimi-
nation laws, which the following examples illustrate.222 
Imagine that one day, a Black woman comes to work with her 
naturally textured or curly hair in a cropped style likely deemed an 
afro. The next day, she arrives at work with her naturally textured or 
curly hair in defined two-strand twists. Applying the strict immuta-
bility doctrine and the attendant demarcation between Black hair 
texture and Black hairstyles the Eleventh Circuit espoused, if the 
employer fires the woman because her hair appears to be an afro 
then she can benefit from Title VII’s protections against race dis-
crimination. Yet, at the point she twists or braids her hair, federal 
protection against race discrimination is no longer available to her. 
Similarly, based upon the Eleventh Circuit’s race-immutability/cul-
ture-mutability distinction, it would have been unlawful for CMS to 
disqualify Ms. Jones from employment for which she was demon-
strably qualified if she wore her natural hair texture in a cropped, 
unstraightened hairstyle. However, because Ms. Jones grew her nat-
ural hair texture longer and locked, the EEOC’s Title VII claim of 
race discrimination on her behalf failed and (magically) CMS’ 
grooming policy and Ms. Jones’ rescinded job offer fell within the 
bounds of lawfulness. All of these instances of discrimination in-
volve the same woman with the same hair texture. However, one act 
of discrimination is deemed unlawful and the other is legal; one act 
of discrimination is deemed remediable and the other irreparable. 
The legal fiction, strict immutability, produces these incoherent and 
unfair results. 
                                                                                                             
 222 Not all federal courts have applied the immutability doctrine to determine 
whether an employer’s regulation of non-physical, mutable characteristics consti-
tutes unlawful race discrimination. The Ninth Circuit held that an employer’s dis-
crimination against a plaintiff’s non-physical, mutable characteristic was unlaw-
ful. See, e.g., El-Hakem v. BJY Inc., 415 F.3d 1068, 1073–74 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that an employer’s directives to an Arab-American employee to change 
his name to a “Western” sounding name as well as renaming the employee against 
his objections because clients may find him “more acceptable” constitutes inten-
tional race discrimination under Section 1981). Acknowledging that “names are 
often a proxy for race and ethnicity” the Ninth Circuit held that discrimination 
against a “genetically-determined physical trait” is not required for an actionable 
race discrimination claim. Id. at 1073. 
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B. Strict Immutability: At Odds with the Law? 
The immutability doctrine is not simply unsupported by Title 
VII’s plain language; courts’ strict application is also at odds with 
the statutory language and established evidentiary routes to prove 
intentional race discrimination. Again, section 703(a) of Title VII 
makes it unlawful for a covered employer: 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any in-
dividual or otherwise discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his . . . terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment  . . . ; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees 
or applicants for employment in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities . . . because of such indi-
vidual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.223 
Employers’ hyper-regulation of Black women’s hair renders dis-
criminatory terms, conditions, and privileges of employment on the 
basis of race and/or gender. Additionally, the implementation and 
enforcement of these grooming policies do in fact deprive Black 
women employment—for which they are qualified or successfully 
perform—because of their race and/or gender.224  
For example, it appears that at no point throughout the series of 
interviews with Ms. Jones did CMS representatives perceive her hair 
as unprofessional or unkempt and thus violative of CMS’ written 
grooming policy. In fact, upon learning that Ms. Jones’ was wearing 
her hair in locks, CMS’ Human Resources Manager conveyed to 
Ms. Jones that she did not find her hair to be unkempt; nevertheless, 
she informed Jones that she was required to cut off her hair because 
it could become messy—in the future.  It is important to note that 
the Human Resources Manager’s perceptions about Ms. Jones’ hair 
changed simply because Jones confirmed that she was wearing 
                                                                                                             
 223 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2010) (italics added). 
 224 Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 2016 WL 7210059 at *4 (choosing to only 
view the case through the lens of disparate treatment as opposed to disparate im-
pact). 
1032 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:987 
 
locks.225 The Human Resources Manager’s reaction is not surprising 
if one considers the ways society stigmatizes locks as unprofessional 
or indicative of criminality and uncleanliness and how these precon-
ceived, pejorative associations manifest themselves in the work-
place especially when African descendants adorn locks.226 With that 
said, if the EEOC had the opportunity to engage in discovery, evi-
dence gathered could reveal that CMS’ Human Resources Manager 
associated such negative stereotypes with locks and/or that she was 
instructed to exclusively regulate locks adorned by African descend-
ants. Indeed, it appears that CMS only instructed Black applicants 
who wore locks to cut off their hair as a condition of employment.227 
Relatedly, the court foreclosed the EEOC’s opportunity to uncover 
evidence concerning the enforcement of the human resources man-
ager’s “propensity to have messy hair standard.” In other words, was 
this subjective standard exclusively applied to Black applicants 
and/or employees, or did all employees or applicants—regardless of 
their race—have to cut their hair if a CMS representative perceived 
it as having a propensity to become messy?228 If the EEOC uncov-
ered the former during discovery, this would be quintessential evi-
dence to support a claim of intentional race discrimination.229 The 
                                                                                                             
 225 Id. at 4. 
 226 See generally, Greene, What’s Hair, supra note 84, at 1387–88 (discussing 
how African descendants’ natural hair is often referred to in derogatory terms like 
“nappy” or “kinky,” perceived as “unclean” or often times associated with crimi-
nality). 
 227 Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 2016 WL 7210059 at 11. 
 228 In Burdine, the Supreme Court emphasized that the plaintiff is allowed to 
liberally engage in discovery in order to sustain her burden of persuasion in a Title 
VII intentional discrimination case. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 
450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981) (internal citation omitted) (“the liberal discovery rules 
applicable to any civil suit in federal court are supplemented in a Title VII suit by 
the plaintiff’s access to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s inves-
tigatory files concerning her complaint. . . [A Title VII] plaintiff will find it par-
ticularly difficult to prove that a proffered explanation lacking a factual basis is a 
pretext”). 
 229 It appears that the court might have held that EEOC put forth a plausible 
claim of intentional race discrimination had the EEOC alleged that CMS applied 
the grooming policy more favorably toward white applicants and employees than 
Black applicants and employees. See EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 837 
F. 3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2016), withdrawn and superseded by, No. 14-13482, 2016 
WL 72120059 at 11 (11th Cir. Dec. 13, 2016). (court explaining that evidence of 
2017] SPLITTING HAIRS 1033 
 
EEOC might have uncovered rare evidence that white applicants or 
employees who wore locks were not instructed to remove them as a 
condition of employment. This evidence, too, would support a claim 
of intentional race discrimination. Lastly, the EEOC could have also 
discovered that CMS’ motivation behind the “neutral” policy was to 
regulate the display of African descendants’ natural hairstyles such 
as locks. All of this evidence would undoubtedly substantiate a 
claim of intentional race discrimination. Notably, however, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that the EEOC’s complaint failed to state a 
claim of intentional race discrimination, implying it was unsuccess-
ful since the EEOC did not allege “that dreadlocks are an immutable 
characteristic of black persons.”230 As a result, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s exacting application of the immutability doctrine led the court 
to affirm the district court’s untenable declaration: any attempt on 
the part of the EEOC to prove intentional race discrimination would 
be “futile.”231 
C. A More Expansive Notion of Immutability: An Avenue to 
Freeing Black Women’s Hair? 
After the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion, the EEOC filed a 
petition for rehearing en banc232 and amici also filed a brief in sup-
port of the EEOC’s petition.233 Appreciating immutability’s strong-
hold in anti-discrimination jurisprudence and its consequences, 
amici urged the court to adopt a more expansive notion of immuta-
                                                                                                             
uneven enforcement of a grooming policy can demonstrate intentional discrimi-
nation). 
 230 Id. at 11 n.2 (court explaining that evidence of uneven enforcement of a 
grooming policy can demonstrate intentional discrimination). 
 231 Id. at 13. 
 232 Petition for Rehearing En Banc, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, 
No. 14-13482, (11th Cir. Oct. 31, 2016). It is important to note that at the time of 
this article’s publication the Eleventh Circuit had not issued a decision regarding 
the EEOC’s petition for rehearing. 
 233 See generally Brief for NAACP et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Appel-
lants, EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Solutions, No. 14-13482 (11th Cir. Dec. 28, 
2016). Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig and I joined the NAACP-Legal De-
fense Fund and the Legal Aid Society—Employment Law Center to file this ami-
cus brief. 
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bility which federal courts have applied in constitutional cases chal-
lenging sexual orientation discrimination.234 In these cases, courts 
permitted sexual orientation discrimination claims based upon the 
concept that immutability embodies characteristics that are  “central 
and fundamental” to one’s identity; therefore, the Constitution guar-
antees protection against discrimination when one is “required to 
abandon” such a characteristic.235 Amici also argued that in Ober-
gefell v. Hodges, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the 
Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee a parallel protection against 
discrimination based upon “personal choices central to individual 
dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define per-
sonal identity and beliefs.”236 Therefore, in determining whether to 
dispense statutory protection, amici pressed the Eleventh Circuit to 
shift its query from “whether a person could change a particular 
characteristic” to “whether the characteristic is something that the 
person should be required to change” because of its centrality to her 
identity.237 Though not perfect,238 judicial application of this more 
expansive notion of immutability—which some legal scholars have  
coined the “new immutability,”239 “personhood” immutability,240 
                                                                                                             
 234 Id. at 26–28. See also generally Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 
125 YALE L.J. 2, 23-27 (2015). 
 235 See id. (citing to Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 
326 (D. Conn. 2012)). 
 236 See id, at 13-14 (citing to Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, slip op. at 10 
(2015). 
 237 See id. (citing to Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1013 (W.D. Wisc. 
2014). 
 238 See Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 11 (2015) 
(critiquing the “new immutability” as a unifying concept across employment dis-
crimination law, as it does not cure the difficulty of distinguishing between which 
characteristics are central to one’s personhood and those that are not and it could 
continue to justify only limited forms of statutory protection like strict immuta-
bility). 
 239 See generally Clarke, id. (in passim). 
 240 Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility 
Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, 108 YALE L.J. 485, 494 
(1998) (explaining that the Ninth Circuit in Watkins v. United States Army “dis-
tinguished among three different kinds of immutability—’strict’ immutability, in 
which the bearer must be unable to change the trait; ’effective’ immutability, in 
which changing the trait is possible but difficult; and ‘personhood’ immutability, 
in which the bearer’s ability to change the trait is irrelevant, as long as it is central 
to her identity) (citing Watkins v. United States Army 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir.), 
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and “soft immutability”241—would bring about a seismic, yet feasi-
ble (and warranted) change in positionality in race-based grooming 
codes discrimination cases. It would require courts to acknowledge 
fully the contentions of African descendants like Renee Rodgers and 
Chastity Jones that their hair texture and the ways in which it grows 
and is styled are central to their personhood as Black women, rather 
than dismissing or refuting their claims.242 As a result, it may cause 
judges to pause before supplanting Black women’s understanding of 
their hair with their own judgments. Moreover, courts may come to 
better appreciate the indignity of employers compelling Black 
women to cut, alter, or cover their natural hair as a condition of em-
ployment. 
CONCLUSION 
Naturally, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in EEOC v. Catastro-
phe Management Solutions generated swift and massive media at-
tention.243 It has been well documented that informal and formal 
grooming policies present a unique yet ubiquitous barrier to employ-
ability and professional advancement for Black women.244 For 
                                                                                                             
amended by 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated and aff’d on other 
grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc). 
 241 See, e.g., Joseph Landau, ”Soft Immutability” and “Imputed Gay Iden-
tity”: Recent Developments in Transgender and Sexual-Orientation-Based Asy-
lum Law, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 237, 263 (2005). 
 242 See Part II.B. (discussing how the court in Rogers v. American Airlines 
dismissed Ms. Rodgers’ claim that her cornrows played an essential role in her 
personhood and self-understanding as a Black woman in parallel ways that don-
ning a hijab for some Muslim women plays a defining role in both the external 
signification and subjective understanding of their religious identity). 
 243 See, e.g., Matt Fernandez, Federal Appeals court upholds ruling in dread-
lock workplace lawsuit, WIAT (Sept. 24, 2016, 8:23 PM), 
http://wiat.com/2016/09/24/federal-appeals-court-upholds-ruling-in-dreadlock-
workplace-lawsuit/; Jacob Gershman, Appeals Court: Employees Don’t Have a 
Right to Wear Dreadlocks, WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG (Sept. 16, 2016, 2:29 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/09/16/appeals-court-employees-dont-have-a-
right-to-wear-dreadlocks/; Victoria M. Massie, Federal appeals court rules it’s 
okay to discriminate against black hairstyles like dreadlocks, VOX (Sept. 19, 
2016, 5:00 PM), http://www.vox.com/2016/9/19/12971790/court-discriminate-
dreadlocks. 
 244 See generally id. 
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many Black women, altering one’s natural hair, or rather, maintain-
ing straightened hair is an explicit or implicit term or condition of 
employment. This article makes clear that the Eleventh Circuit’s 
opinion maintains this status quo and exacerbates the hyper-regula-
tion of Black women’s bodies via their hair. The Eleventh Circuit’s 
premature dismissal of the EEOC’s grooming codes discrimination 
case shields covered employers from Title VII liability even where 
they may have engaged in textbook intentional race discrimination, 
as it legitimizes barring complainants from engaging in discovery in 
grooming codes cases not involving afros. The Eleventh Circuit’s 
early dismissal of the EEOC’s case also insulates covered employers 
who ban African descendant women from donning their naturally 
textured hair—when not shaped like an afro—as long they are acting 
pursuant to a formal or an informal grooming policy that expects 
“professional” or “business-like” hairstyles. Moreover, the panel’s 
enhanced version of strict immutability and the race-immutabil-
ity/culture-mutability distinction makes it impossible for race dis-
crimination plaintiffs to challenge discrimination against mutable 
characteristics despite their nexus to race. Thus, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s hair splitting decision amplified nearly forty years of federal 
precedent permitting the lawful deprivation of employment oppor-
tunities for which African descendant women are qualified along-
side their equal inclusion, dignity, and privileges of employment 
when they grow their unstraightened, naturally textured hair long or 
when their hair does not perfectly resemble an afro. 
